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Abstract 
 
Since their inception, Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fisheries have attracted 
participants willing to undertake great financial and personal risks to participate in these high 
valued fisheries. Although entry to the fisheries is limited, excess capital and overcapacity, 
together with stock declines, have resulted in a race for fish. The shortest season is in the Bristol 
Bay red king crab fishery, which has been prosecuted for less than one week in recent years. 
Efforts of managers to protect declining stocks by reducing allowable catch have increased the 
economic stress on participants and communities that depend on these fisheries and increased 
pressure on participants to take greater risks.  
 
For several years, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council worked with participants to 
address these problems in the crab fisheries through series of working groups and management 
measures. In 2001, Congress stepped in, directing the Council to assess various rationalization
1 
programs for the fisheries, including individual fishing quotas (IFQs), processor shares, 
cooperatives, and quotas held by communities. The outcome of the Council process is a new and 
unique management program selected by a unanimous vote of the North Pacific Council. The 
program reflects the Council’s desire to accommodate the interests of several groups dependent 
on these fisheries—vessel owners, processors, captains and crew, and communities. Under the 
program, harvest quota shares (QS) will be issued to vessel owners and captains. Processors will 
be issued processing quota shares. Under these allocations, 90 percent of harvest quota shares are 
designated for delivery to holders of processing quota shares. Community interests are protected 
by a requirement that a certain portion of the catch be landed and processed in designated regions. 
An arbitration program is included to resolve price disputes, which could arise because of the 
constraints on markets created by the dual share allocations. The result of the Council’s action is 
one of the most complex fishery management programs to date. The attempt to satisfy many 
interests creates significant hurdles that must be overcome for the program to succeed 
economically and environmentally.  
 
This paper describes key dimensions of the proposed crab fishery management program and 
identifies the most substantial hurdles that the program must overcome for the Council to judge it 
a successful management program for the fisheries. First, managers will be challenged by 
program implementation. Implementation will require initial allocations of harvesting shares to 
vessel owners and captains and processing shares to processors. Most shares will be regionally 
designated based on the participant’s landings history. Second, managers will face the challenge 
of protecting stocks as the incentives to high grade increase in the share-based fishery. Third, the 
markets for the harvest shares, captains shares, and processing shares must develop in a manner 
that facilitates coordination of harvesting and processing activity required by the share system 
and the regional landing and processing requirements. Lastly, market opportunities for harvest 
landings will be constrained by the requirement that deliveries be made to a processing share 
holder in a designated region. For the program to be considered a success, price formation in the 
market for landings must be perceived as fair. Each of these issues is described in a manner that 
provides the reader with a perspective of the institutional challenges faced by a program that 
attempts to address the concerns of several different interests. In addition, characteristics of the 
fisheries that contribute to the potential to overcome these obstacles are discussed. 
 
 
                                                      
1  “Rationalization” is a frequently used, seldom defined term that describes certain fishery management 
plans. Generally, the term is used to describe a management plan that results in an allocation of labor and 
capital between fishing and other industries that maximizes the net value of production (NMFS, 2003a).   2
The Current Management Problem 
 
The eight major BSAI crab fisheries
2 are currently managed under the License Limitation 
Program, a limited entry program under which licenses are allocated based on historic 
participation. Licenses are endorsed for one or more area and species. Table 1 shows the number 
of licenses in each fishery. Licenses are issued by vessel type, catcher vessel or catcher/processor. 
Interim licenses are currently subject to adjudication under recent participation requirements. 
Since licenses can carry multiple area/species endorsements, the total number of licenses is not 
additive. 
 
Table 1. Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Crab License Limitation Program Licenses by Endorsement 
and Vessel Type. 





Aleutian Island brown 
king 
W. Aleutian Island (Adak) brown king 
E. Aleutian Island (Dutch Harbor) brown king 
9 29  38 
Aleutian Island red king  Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) red king*  5 33  38 
BSAI opilio/bairdi 
Tanner 
Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab) 
Bering Sea C. bairdi (Tanner crab) 
27 282  309 
Bristol Bay red king  Bristol Bay red king  26 276  302 
Pribilof Islands red/blue 
king 
Pribilof blue and red king  3 133  136 
St Matthew blue king  St. Matthew blue king  14 185  199 
Total Licenses    27  294  321 
*This endorsement also applies to the Western Aleutian Islands (Dutch Harbor) red king crab fishery. The fishery has 
been closed for approximately 20 years. 
 
Notwithstanding the limit on entry under this management program, conditions in the fisheries 
are symptomatic of substantial overcapacity. The three largest fisheries, the Bristol Bay red king 
crab, the Bering Sea C. opilio (or snow crab), and the Bering Sea C. bairdi (Tanner crab) 
fisheries, have received the most fishing effort. Stock declines in the Bristol Bay red king crab 
and the Bering Sea C. opilio have led to short derby seasons of a few days or weeks suggesting 
substantial overcapitalization. The Bering Sea C. bairdi fishery has been closed for the past 
several seasons as have the Pribilof blue and red king crab and the St. Matthew blue king crab 
fisheries due to stock declines. When open, these fisheries also received substantial effort, 
primarily from vessels that also participate in the larger crab fisheries. The Aleutian Islands 
golden king crab fisheries have received less effort than most of the other BSAI crab fisheries due 
to their remote grounds and the need for specialized gear for participation. Participation in these 
fisheries has increased in recent years and would likely increase further without a change in 
management. The Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) red king crab fishery has been closed in 
recent years, but opened in 2002 for a season under a new harvest strategy. The 2002 season 
lasted approximately 2 days. 
 
Since these fisheries are currently managed under the License Limitation Program, harvester 
entry is limited. Individual harvests, however, are determined by a competitive race for fish. 
                                                      
2  One additional fishery, the Norton Sound red and blue king crab fishery, may be considered a major crab 
fishery. This fishery is managed under superexclusive permitting, obviating the problems that driving the 
proposed changes in management in the other fisheries.    3
Safety can be compromised by the incentive to harvest the high-valued crab more quickly than 
others. At the extreme, during the 2002 Bristol Bay red king crab fishery season, which lasted 
only 68 hours, fewer than 250 vessels harvested more than 8.5 million pounds of crab. The ex 
vessel price of crab during the season was approximately $6.80 per pound. So, the gross revenue 
of the average vessel was in excess of $200,000. The fleet harvested over $ ¾ million of crab 
each hour of the season. 
 
Since the seasons in most of the fisheries do not conflict, most participants are active in several of 
the fisheries, moving from one fishery to another throughout the year. Notwithstanding these 
opportunistic movements from fishery to fishery, equipment is often idle for several months of 
the year, suggesting substantial overcapitalization. In addition, several participants report that 
they are unable to breakeven in the fisheries at current harvest levels.  
 
The Proposed Management Program 
 
For several years, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council worked with participants to 
address these problems in the crab fisheries through series of working groups and management 
measures. In 2001, Congress stepped in, directing the Council to assess various rationalization 
programs for the fisheries, including IFQs, processor shares, cooperatives, and quotas held by 
communities. The outcome of the Council process is a new and unique management program 
selected by a unanimous vote of the North Pacific Council. The program reflects the Council’s 
desire to accommodate the interests of several groups dependent on these fisheries—vessel 
owners, processors, captains and crew, and communities. The result is one of the most complex 
fishery management programs to date.  
 
The Harvest Sector 
 
In each fishery, harvesters would be allocated quota shares (QS), a revocable privilege that allow 
the holder to receive an annual allocation of a specific portion of the annual TAC from a fishery. 
These annual allocations are referred to as IFQs. QS will be designated as either catcher vessel 
shares or catcher/processor shares, depending on whether the vessel that created the privilege to 
the shares processed the qualifying harvests on board. Catcher vessel IFQ would be issued in two 
classes, Class A shares and Class B shares. Class A shares, which will require delivery of 
harvests to a processor holding processor quota, will be issued for 90 percent of the TAC in each 
fishery. Class A shares will also be subject to regionalization, under which harvests will be 
required to be delivered within an identified region. Class B shares, which will permit delivery of 
harvests to any processor (except catcher/processors) and would not be regionally designated, 
will be issued for the remaining 10 percent of the TAC. The issuance of Class B shares is 
intended to provide harvesters with additional market leverage for negotiating prices for landings 
of crab. Consequently, Class B shares will be allocated only to harvesters that are unaffiliated 
with holders of processing shares. This Class A/Class B share division is intended to balance the 
interests of processors and communities with the interests of harvesters.  
 
A harvester’s allocation of QS for a fishery would be based on historic landings in that fishery 
(excluding landings of deadloss). Specifically, each allocation is the harvester’s average annual 
portion of the total qualified catch during a specific qualifying period. Qualifying periods were 
selected to balance historical participation and recent participation. Different periods were 
selected for different fisheries to accommodate closures and other circumstances in the fisheries 
in recent years. The most recent seasons were excluded in part to limit the effectiveness of efforts 
by participants to obtain a larger allocation by increasing participation in recent seasons when it 
was apparent that allocations would be based on historic harvest levels. Table 2 shows a summary   4
of the allocations to harvesters in the different fisheries.  
 
Table 2. Summary of harvest allocations (allocations reported are the share of the total allocation) 
and ownership caps. 
 
Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) Golden King Crab 11 0.026 0.216 0.10 *
Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) Red King Crab 28 0.008 0.193 0.10 6
Bristol Bay Red King Crab 254 0.004 0.009 0.01 10
Bering Sea C. Opilio 245 0.004 0.010 0.01 16
Bering Sea C. Bairdi (EBS Tanner Crab) 266 0.004 0.011 0.01 17
Eastern Aleutian Islands (Dutch Harbor) Golden King Crab 12 0.077 0.157 0.10 6
Pribilof Red and Blue King Crab 110 0.006 0.031 0.02 18
St. Matthew Blue King Crab 138 0.008 0.015 0.02 *
* Withheld for confidentiality


















QS and IFQ would both be transferrable under the program, subject to limits on the amount of 
shares a person may own or use. Transferability of shares is necessary to reduce fleet size and 
remove capital from the fishery. Separate caps would be imposed on the ownership of shares by 
any person and the use of IFQs on any vessel. These caps are intended to prevent excessive 
consolidation of shares under the program. Limits on consolidation can be used to ensure 
adequate levels of market competition, facilitate entry to the fishery, protect labor markets, and 
ensure that the resource supports several participants. Different caps are chosen for the different 
fisheries because of different fleet characteristics and the differences in historic dependency of 
participants on the different fisheries.
3 Vessel use caps would not apply to cooperatives providing 
an additional incentive for cooperative participation. The ownership and use caps proposed for 
the different fisheries are also shown in Table 2.
4 Table 2 also shows the estimated number of 
registered license holders that would be allocated shares in excess of the applicable ownership 
caps. Initial allocations of shares above the cap would be grandfathered.  
 
The Processing Sector 
 
The program would also allocate to processors a processing privilege, processing quota shares 
(PQS), that is analogous to the harvest privilege allocated to harvesters. These allocations to 
processors are intended to protect processor investment in the fisheries and balance the 
bargaining power of processors with harvesters receiving harvest shares. PQS are a revocable 
privilege to receive deliveries of a specific portion of the annual TAC from a fishery. These 
annual allocations of processing privileges are referred to as Individual Processing Quotas (IPQs). 
IPQs would be issued for 90 percent of the allocated harvests, corresponding to the 90 percent 
allocation of Class A harvest shares. The remaining 10 percent of processing would not 
                                                      
3 Ownership caps are applied individually and collectively. Under this rule all of a person’s direct holdings 
are credited toward the cap. In addition, a person’s indirect holdings are also credited toward the cap in 
proportion to the person’s ownership interest. For example, if a person owns a 20 percent interest in a 
company that holds 100 shares, that person is credited with holding 20 shares for purposes of determining 
compliance with the cap. 
4 The analysis relied on registered license holder data files, which do not show ownership holdings beyond 
the registered owner. Detailed ownership data necessary for full analysis of ownership is currently 
unavailable because of restrictions that prevent analysts from accessing detailed ownership information. 
Application of the rules under the program will require the submission of detailed ownership information 
by shareholders.  
   5
unallocated, and therefore deliverable to any processor, is intended to strike a balance of 
bargaining power between the harvesting and processing sectors. In addition, this unallocated 10 
percent of processing could provide for entry to that sector. Generally, processing shares would 
be regionally designated for processing in a North or South region (corresponding to the regional 
designation of the Class A harvest shares). PQS allocations would be based on processing history 
during a specified qualifying period for each fishery. A processor’s allocation in a fishery would 
equal its share of all qualified processing in the qualifying period (i.e., pounds processed by the 
processor divided by pounds processed by all qualified processors). Table 3 shows summary 
statistics for the allocations of processing shares in the different fisheries.  
 
Table 3. Summary of processing allocations (allocations reported are the share of the total 
allocation) and ownership caps. 
 
Fishery Median







of the 30% 
cap
Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) Golden King Crab 0.008 0.244 10 *
Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) Red King Crab
1 0.008 0.244 10 *
Bristol Bay Red King Crab 0.017 0.156 19 0
Bering Sea C. Opilio 0.020 0.145 22 0
Bering Sea C. Bairdi (EBS Tanner Crab) 0.006 0.150 27 0
Eastern Aleutian Islands (Dutch Harbor) Golden King Crab 0.060 0.233 8 *
Pribilof Red and Blue King Crab 0.038 0.173 15 0
St. Matthew Blue King Crab 0.043 0.193 13 *
1 Allocation is based on the WAI (Adak) golden king crab allocation.
* Witheld for confidentiality.
Sources: NPFMC Crab Rationalization Database, Version 1, 2001.  
 
Processor shares would be transferable, including leasing of PQS (or equivalently, the sale of 
IPQs) subject only to use and ownership caps. IPQs would be usable at any facility of a processor 
without transfer. In addition, new processors would enter the fishery by purchasing PQS or IPQs 
or by purchasing crab harvested with Class B shares. Ownership of PQS would be limited to 30 
percent of the outstanding PQS in a fishery.
5 Initial allocations of shares above the cap would be 
grandfathered. Processing use caps for other species and regions were not included.  The number 
of allocations in excess of the ownership cap in each fishery is also shown in Table 3.   
 
Processor allocations are substantially more concentrated than harvester allocations. This relative 
concentration occurs for two reasons. First and of greater importance, there are relatively fewer 
processors active in the fisheries than vessels active in the fishery. Second, more complete 
ownership information is available concerning processors. Processor allocations were aggregated 
to the company level. Company ownership of facilities was determined based on existing records 
with the assistance of processor representatives. This allowed the analysts to obtain a fairly 




                                                      
5 PQS ownership caps would be applied using a threshold rule for determining whether the shares are held 
by a processor and then the individual and collective rule for determining the extent of share ownership. 
Under the threshold rule, any entity with 10 percent or more common ownership with a processor is 
considered to be a part of that processor. Any direct holdings of those entities would be fully credited to the 
processor’s holdings. Indirect holdings of those entities would be credited toward the processor’s cap in 
proportion to the entities ownership.   6
Catcher/processor provisions 
 
Catcher/processors participate in both the harvest and processing sectors and therefore have a 
unique position in the program. To protect their historic role and participation, catcher/processors 
will be allocated catcher/processor QS and corresponding catcher/processor IFQs under the 
program. These shares will carry both a harvest privilege and an accompanying on board 
processing privilege. Catcher/processors will be allocated catcher/processor shares in accordance 
with the allocation rules for harvest shares for all qualified catch that was processed on board. 
Holders of catcher/processor IFQs may choose not to process harvested crab, instead delivering 
that unprocessed crab to any other processor. Use of catcher/processor shares in this manner 
would be akin to the use of Class B harvest shares, which do not require the receiving processor 
to hold IPQs. Catcher/processor shares would not have regional designations, so the delivery of 
these shares will not be regionally limited.  
 
Holders of catcher/processor shares may also sever the harvesting and processing privileges, 
thereby creating separate Class A catcher vessel QS and PQS. These newly severed interests 
would create a privilege to annual IFQ allocations and IPQ allocations, which could be held by 
different individuals. When severed, the resulting QS and PQS must be designated for a region 
with both shares taking the same regional designation. Allowing the conversion of shares permits 
a catcher/processor shareholder to realize the full value of shares and provides greater flexibility 
in using the privileges. Adding a regional designation would prevent the creation of a new class 




   
The program would permit harvesters to form voluntary cooperatives associated with one or more 
processors holding PQS. Cooperatives are intended to facilitate efficiency in the harvest sector by 
aiding harvesters in coordinating harvest activities among members and deliveries to processors. 
Both sectors could realize efficiencies through well coordinated activities and flow of product. 
Harvesters can benefit by the cooperative relationship through which shares can be quickly traded 
under prearranged terms and conditions. These trades should help harvesters consolidate small 
portions of their allocations on a single vessel at the end of the season when a small portion of 
each vessel’s allocation is remaining. In the pollock cooperatives organized under the American 
Fisheries Act, harvesters have effectively coordinated harvests so that less of than 1 percent of the 
TAC is unharvested. In the halibut and sablefish fisheries, which are managed with IFQs with 
limited leasing, harvesters have left more than 5 percent of the TAC unharvested. Processors can 
also benefit from cooperatives, which can coordinate deliveries so that processing crews and 
equipment have less down time between deliveries. Delivery coordination can also reduce 
queuing of harvesters waiting to offload their harvests, reducing deadloss of harvested crab. 
 
Annual IFQ allocations of individuals that are cooperative members would be made to the 
cooperative. Processors that associate with cooperatives would not be members of the 
cooperatives but would remain independent. A cooperative would not be bound to deliver any 
harvests to an associated processor provided that the cooperative complies with any delivery 
requirements of the program associated with the harvest and processing shares. Processor 
association, however, is intended to facilitate delivery coordination. Harvesters within a 
cooperative would be permitted to transfer shares freely and vessels on which cooperative shares 
are fished would not be subject to use caps. Shares would also be freely transferable between 
cooperatives, but these transfers would require filing with NOAA Fisheries Restricted Access 




BSAI crab fisheries have a history of contentious price negotiations. Harvesters have often acted 
collectively to negotiate an ex vessel price with processors, at times delaying fishing to pressure 
price concessions from processors. Because the processing share allocations under the program 
are novel, the effects on price negotiations cannot be fully predicted. To guide price negotiations 
under the new program, the Council has included a provision for binding arbitration for the 
settlement of price disputes. The binding arbitration system is intended to compel shareholders to 
offer reasonable terms and, if necessary, establish reasonable price when a negotiated price 
cannot be reached. In a system with a one-to-one relationship of harvest and processing shares, 
the market of persons for a shareholder to transact with will be limited. The concern is most acute 
for the shareholders from each sector that are last to contract for their shares.  
 
The arbitration program would apply only to A shares, which require delivery to a holder of 
processing shares. The arbitration standard directs the arbitrator to identify a price that preserves 
the historic division of first wholesale revenues between the two sectors. Industry participants 
supported the historical division of revenues as a fair method of preserving the balance of 
interests of the two sectors in the fisheries. The arbitrator would be permitted to consider other 
relevant factors, such as changes in product markets and prevailing prices, when applying this 
standard. 
 
The price settlement process outlined in the arbitration program would begin with an industry 
selected market analyst and arbiter developing a market report and a non-binding price formula. 
The non-binding price formula is intended to provide a benchmark price that will be a starting 
point for negotiations and minimize the number of price disputes as negotiations progress. 
Participants are provided with latitude to settle a price that varies from the announced price to 
accommodate individual circumstances, such as delivery timing and location. After the 
negotiating period, harvesters can unilaterally initiate a binding arbitration proceeding with any 
holder of uncommitted processing shares by committing deliveries to that processor. The non-
binding benchmark price would be used as a guide by the arbiter, but the delivery price could be 
changed to accommodate the circumstances of the transaction at the discretion of the arbiter. The 
arbitration proceeding would be final offer, under which the arbiter is limited to choosing 
between two final offers submitted, one from each party.  
 
The first stage of the two-stage arbitration structure of this process should minimize disputes by 
providing participants with a synopsis of market conditions and an early signal of a reasonable 
price on which offers can be based during the negotiation period. The second stage binding 
arbitration proceedings are conducted at an individual level that provides for the resolution of all 
issues raised by the parties to the price dispute. 
 
Community protection measures 
 
The program contains several provisions intended to protect the interests of communities that 
depend on the fisheries. Development of these provisions required the Council to balance the 
interests of several communities not only against one another, but also against the interests of the 
harvesting and processing sectors. The St. George and St. Paul, in the Pribilof Islands depend on 
the crab fisheries as their economic base and could suffer from consolidation of activities in ports 
in the Aleutians and Alaska Peninsula that might be stimulated by slowing the race for fish. Adak 
is developing its crab industry after the recent departure of the military. Dutch Harbor has long 
depended on the crab fisheries and is home to several processors that support fleets in many   8
fisheries. King Cove is highly dependent on a single processor active in both crab and groundfish 
fisheries. Kodiak, historically depended on crab fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska, has maintained an 
interest in the more distant Bering Sea crab fisheries through its fleet and some of its processors.  
 
Many of the measures, including the underlying two-pie structure of the program, are intended to 
provide community protections absent in a more traditional harvester-only IFQ program. 
Allocation of processing shares for 90 percent of the TAC is intended to support communities' 
historic participation by tying quota to community-based processing. This community link is 
intended to provide stability to not only the processing sector but also to supporting industries in 
the communities.  
 
Several additional provisions are included in the program to protect communities. A two-year 
“cooling off period” would be established during which processing shares cannot be relocated 
from the community where the historical processing occurred that led to the allocation. Under this 
provision, all processing shares will bear a community designation, which will require processing 
of the share in the community for the first two years of the program. The “cooling off period” is 
intended to provide a period of general stability for processors and communities to adjust to the 
program. At the beginning of share-based management, trading of shares could lead to rapid 
consolidation in the processing sector, as some processors may choose to exit the fisheries. The 
“cooling off period” requirement is intended to provide each historic processing community with 
an added opportunity to entice processors to maintain facilities in the community under the new 
management structure.  
 
A right of first refusal will be granted to community and Community Development Quota
6 (CDQ) 
groups from communities with significant crab processing history on the sale of any processing 
shares for use outside of the community. The right of first refusal is a compromise reached by a 
committee comprised of representatives of communities, processors, and harvesters. The 
provision provides flexibility for companies to consolidate operations within the company to 
achieve efficiencies, while providing a community and CDQ groups with a right to intervene on 
behalf of a community, if a local processor intends to sell its interest in the crab fisheries. These 
community and CDQ groups would also be permitted to purchase harvesting and processing 
shares to enhance fisheries activities for their communities.  
 
Caps on the total amount of Individual Processing Quota (or the annual allocation of processing 
shares) would be established in the two largest fisheries, the Bristol Bay red king crab and the 
Bering Sea C. opilio fisheries. In years of low abundance processor shares will provide stability 
to the processing sector and historically dependent communities. As stocks increase, the caps will 
limit the allocation of processing shares providing opportunity for new processors and 
communities to participate and limits any potential windfall to historic participants. In the Bering 
Sea C. opilio fishery, the proposed 175 million pound cap was exceeded 5 times between 1990 to 
2000. Bristol Bay red king crab 20 million pound cap was exceeded 11 times in the last 33 years. 
 
Captain and crew share (C share) allocation 
 
Three percent of the TAC would be allocated as a separate class of shares (C shares) that will be 
allocated to eligible captains. Holders of these shares will be required to be onboard the vessel 
fishing the shares and can transfer the shares only to active participants in the crab fisheries. 
                                                      
6 The CDQ program is an economic development program under which harvest allocations are made to 
groups representing rural Western Alaska communities to facilitate fishing activity and economic 
development in those areas.   9
These “owner-on-board” requirements are intended to benefit both captains and crew. Ownership 
caps enacted in the program are intended to ensure that a reasonable number of active captains 
and crew benefit from C share ownership. 
 
Data Collection Program 
 
A program to collect economic data from harvesting and processing sectors would be used to 
evaluate the success of the program. This mandatory program would collect revenue, 
employment, and variable cost data and any fixed cost data necessary to analyze variable costs 
from all participants in both sectors. A third party entity will collect the data and provide it to 
analysts in a blind format to ensure confidentiality. 
 
Implications and Challenges 
 
For the Council to view its program as a success several goals will need to be achieved. This 
section examines some of those goals and also some of the more imposing hurdles to the success 




Implementation of the program will require the allocation of harvest shares to license holders and 
captains and processing shares to processors. All shares will be regionally designated based on 
where landings that led to the allocation occurred. In addition, processing shares will be 
designated by community for establishing the community protections. Developing each of these 
allocations is a substantial task requiring detailed landing records. Although the allocations are 
daunting, available records should facilitate the task. The State of Alaska collects fish tickets for 
all landings creating a historical record that can be used for analyzing the fisheries and 
administering certain management programs. In addition, State Commercial Operator’s Annual 
Reports required of processors can be used for verification of fish ticket data, where necessary. 
The initial allocation of harvest shares will be aided by the current limited entry program, the 
License Limitation Program (LLP), which will be used to determine harvester eligibility.  
 
Based on the analysis supporting the Council’s selection of the preferred program, approximately 
300 vessels, 30 processors, and 200 captains will qualify for allocations. The number of 
allocations is substantially less than the 6,000 persons that applied for allocations in the halibut 
and sablefish program implemented by the Restricted Access Management (RAM) Division of 
the National Marine Fisheries Service, the same agency that will administer the crab program 
(RAM, 2002). Given the available data and the experience of managers from administering the 
halibut and sablefish IFQ program, administration of the initial allocations, while time 
consuming, should be manageable. 
 
Inseason Management and Environment Implications 
 
In the current derby fisheries, managers monitor harvests by voluntary inseason reports and 
attempt to time the closure of the fishery with completion of the harvest of the guideline harvest 
level (GHL), a range identifying an acceptable total catch.  Although managers have become very 
good at estimating total harvests, the GHL may be exceeded through no fault of the managers 
because inseason monitoring cannot keep pace with harvests during the short seasons. For 
example, in the Bering Sea C. opilio fishery the harvest exceeded the GHL in every year from 
1995 to 2000. 
   10
In the share-based fishery under the proposed management program, total catch is likely to be 
managed more precisely under a total allowable catch (TAC), which is a specific catch limit. In 
addition, the individual allocations under the proposed management also increase accountability 
and decrease the chance of overharvests from the fishery.
7 Overages will be forfeited under the 
program and underages will not be credited in the following year. 
 
Reductions in bycatch mortality could also result from the change in management.
8 In general, 
crab mortality from bycatch should decline under share-based management. Harvesters in the 
current race for fish deploy and retrieve gear in relatively short cycles. Fixed share allocations in 
a share-based fishery will allow harvesters to use longer soak times allowing crab pot escape 
mechanisms to function reducing harvests and discards and associated mortality of undersized 
and female crab. Relaxation of pot limits, currently in place to allow managers to control effort, 
should also contribute to longer soak times. Harvesters with fewer time constraints should also be 
able to fish with greater care, reducing the number of pots that are lost on the grounds each year.  




Although total landings may be more precisely specified by the program, a competing effect 
could arise if harvesters perceive a benefit to high grading. High grading is likely to occur if the 
increase in revenues from discarding low value, barnacled or brown shell crab and harvesting 
high value, clean shell crab exceeds the increase in cost of sorting, making discards, and 
additional harvests.
10  The time pressures of the current derby fishery reduce the benefits of high 
grading since a harvest share is sacrificed by discarding crab. Under the new management, 
discards will not reduce harvest shares. To the extent that efforts of the harvest sector to increase 
quality of catch increase discard mortality or have stock effects, these efforts could reduce the 
benefits derived from the fishery in the long run.
11 The extent and effects of any high grading 
problem cannot be predicted. More extensive monitoring will be necessary to determine the 
extent of high grading. If necessary harvest strategy
12 modifications could be made to curtail high 
grading or mitigate its stock effects. Vessel Monitoring Systems and increased observer coverage 
and dockside sampling are needed to determine if changes in fishery selectivity occur. If changes 
are noted, the harvest strategies used to determine TACs will need to be modified accordingly. 
                                                      
7 Underharvesting, which is likely to occur under a share-based management, can be limited by liberal 
share transfer rights and coordination among harvesters. For example, in the Bering Sea pollock fisheries, 
coordination of the pollock cooperatives has led to harvests of greater than 99 percent of the TAC without 
overharvest. 
8  Bycatch of groundfish in the crab fisheries is very limited and is not viewed as a environmental problem 
in these fisheries. 
9 Ghost fishing is a term used to describe pots that are lost, but a still in a condition to continue catching 
crab or other fish.  Crab trapped in the pots and die, effectively rebaiting the trap.  Depending on how long 
it takes for the twine on the escape mechanism in a pot to decompose, a lost pot may continue ghost fishing 
for several months. 
10  For a discussion of high grading in IFQ fisheries see Copes (1986). Copes also questions whether the 
setting of a fixed TAC is preferable to a more flexible arrangement that allows managers to close seasons 
with lower total harvests, if ongoing monitoring suggest stock conditions are worse than perceived at the 
time the TAC was set. 
11 Issuance of fixed harvest allocations that extend several years into the future are argued by some to 
reduce the incentive for detrimental high grading, if fishers perceive a future cost to high grading. Others 
caution that the assumption that long term allocations will protect against overharvests depends on the 
nature of the stock in question. 
12 Harvest strategies are the rules by which TACs are set. Modifying assumptions concerning harvests and 
bycatch mortality in these models can accommodate some changes in harvest behavior.   11
 
Markets for Shares and Coordination of the Industry 
 
The harvest share/processing share system, which will apply to 90 percent of the allocation in 
each fishery complicates the fishery operationally. The one-to-one relationship between 
processing shares and Class A harvest shares (which require landing with a holder of unused 
processing shares) will require that each share holder match up shares with a share holder in the 
other sector. Regional designations on these shares and the two-year community designations on 
most processing shares will impose additional coordination requirements on harvesters and 
processors that need to meet these geographic landing requirements. Although this level of 
coordination may seem insurmountable a few characteristics of the fisheries and the management 
program should help industry reach an acceptable level of coordination. First, the fisheries have 
relatively few participants, many of whom know each other and have worked together for several 
years. Approximately 30 processors qualify for allocations under the program. A large majority 
of processing shares will be allocated to seven or eight large processors, substantially limiting the 
number of shareholders that harvesters must work with to coordinate deliveries. The few 
relatively small processors could pose some coordination problem to harvesters that do not match 
shares with the large processors. A second factor that is likely to facilitate coordination is the 
structure of the preseason arbitration program. To take advantage of arbitration, harvesters will 
need to commit landings to holders of unused processing shares in the preseason. This matching 
of shares should result in the coordination of landings required to meet the landing requirements 
of the dual share system. A third factor that is likely to aid in coordination of landings is the 
program structure for trading of shares. Harvest shares are freely leasable, so harvesters can fish 
the shares of others, if needed to coordinate landings. In addition, a voluntary cooperative 
structure is promoted by the program. Harvesters may form cooperatives to harvest allocations in 
accordance with a cooperative agreement. Although cooperatives are voluntary, most harvesters 
believe cooperatives will become the norm in these fisheries. Cooperatives add to coordination by 
creating an institution with pre-established rules for exchange of harvest shares. Cooperative 
member’s annual harvest allocations will be made to the cooperative, so share transfers within the 
cooperative need not be administered by fishery managers.
13 Lastly, the high value of these 
fisheries and the substantial investments necessary to participate create a significant incentive for 
participants to achieve the coordination necessary to fully harvest allocations. Although 
coordination of landings under the dual share allocation will pose a challenge to participants, the 
nature of the fisheries and the management structure should aid in coordination of landings under 
the program. 
 
Fairness and Equity 
 
The greatest controversy surrounding the program concerns its fairness. The processor share 
allocation is made to address the perceived inequity of a more traditional harvester-only IFQ 
program, in which substantial market power may shift to harvesters.
14 The greatest concern is 
expressed by some harvesters who question the equity of the sharing of rents established by the 
                                                      
13 Pre-filing of cooperative agreements with the managers facilitates oversight of cooperative structure and 
membership. Landings of cooperative members are applied to the cooperative’s allocation. The cooperative 
institution facilitates transactions, reducing monitoring and enforcement costs (Criddle and Macinko, 
2000). 
14 To date, one study has examined this issue (Matulich and Clark, 2002). Although the methodology of the 
study has drawn criticism (GAO, 2002), the premise that market power of harvesters with respect to 
processors may change with the allocation of harvest shares is acknowledged elsewhere (see National 
Research Council, 1999).   12
dual share allocations. Clearly, the allocation of processing shares will limit the market available 
to harvesters. Two program elements are intended to respond to harvester concerns about the 
limited competition for landings. First, the allocation of 10 percent of the harvest share allocation 
as B shares (deliverable to any processor regardless of processing share holdings) is intended to 
provide harvesters with additional negotiating leverage. Second, the arbitration program will 
provide an outside means for harvesters to settle prices for A share landings (which must be 
delivered to a processor holding processing shares).  
 
The benefit of B share allocations to harvesters is uncertain and will be affected by a few factors. 
Because only harvesters can initiate arbitration proceedings and arbitration only applies to A 
shares, the arbitration program provides harvesters with the ability to separate the price 
determination for B shares from the price determination from A shares. As a result, harvesters 
will be able to separate the price determination for the two share types to induce competition 
among processors for B share landings.
15 The extent to which harvesters can induce processors to 
compete for B share landings by offering higher prices for A share landings is uncertain and also 
depends on the effects of the arbitration program.
16  
 
The arbitration program creates a complex process with several facets that could affect prices. 
The arbitration standard directs the arbiter to select a price that preserves the historic division of 
first wholesale revenues while considering other relevant factors, such as product improvements 
and delivery location and timing. This standard was developed by an industry committee to 
provide certainty to the arbitration process. The ability of the arbiter to consider any relevant 
factors, however, adds considerable uncertainty and provides the arbiter with substantial power. 
An arbiter must exercise this power judiciously for decisions to be considered fair. The multistage 
arbitration system should help develop fairness.  
 
In the first stage of the process general market trends are examined by a market analysis and a 
price is developed to inform negotiations and the future individual arbitration proceedings. This 
broad look at the market should ensure that harvesters that are compelled deliver to low revenue 
processors by the processing share program are not treated substantially different from harvesters 
that deliver to high revenue processors. In the second stage of the process, harvesters will have 
the unilateral power to initiate an arbitration proceeding by committing deliveries to a processor 
holding uncommitted processing shares. Providing only harvesters with the ability to initiate an 
arbitration proceeding should increase acceptance of the program to harvesters that are compelled 
to deliver to processor’s holding shares. Whether this complex system of establishing linkages 
between harvesters and processors and determining prices will be perceived as fair cannot be 
fully predicted. 
                                                      
15 Most processors in the crab fisheries are also active in Alaska groundfish fisheries. Many crab harvesters 
have limited activity in other fisheries. The greater dependence of harvesters on crab fisheries is thought by 
some to increase the power of processors in negotiations. Some harvesters feared that this power and the 
leverage of processing share allocations could be used to pressure harvesters to deliver both A and B share 
landings to processing share holders. 
16 An experimental analysis of a pre-season fleet wide arbitration structure suggests that processors might 
compete for B share landings by offering higher prices for A share landings. The non-binding fleet wide 
structure selected by the Council differs from the binding fleet wide structure that was experimentally 
analyzed in several respects. Whether the fleet wide component of the arbitration structure selected by the 
Council would lead to processor A share price competition for B share landings is not known.   13
Conclusion 
 
This paper describes key dimensions of the proposed crab fishery management program and 
identifies the most substantial hurdles that the program must overcome for the Council to judge it 
a successful management program for the fisheries. First, managers will be challenged by 
program implementation. Implementation will require initial allocations of harvesting shares to 
vessel owners and captains and processing shares to processors. Most shares will be regionally 
designated based on the participant’s landings history. Second, managers will face the challenge 
of protecting stocks as the incentives to high grade increase in the share-based fishery. Third, the 
markets for the harvest shares, captains shares, and processing shares must develop in a manner 
that facilitates coordination of harvesting and processing activity required by the share system 
and the regional landing and processing requirements. Lastly, market opportunities for harvest 
landings will be constrained by the requirement that deliveries be made to a processing share 
holder in a designated region. For the program to be considered a success, price formation in the 
market for landings must be perceived as fair. The long run challenge to the program is to achieve 
acceptance among all stakeholders – industry, environmental groups, and the public. The Council 
will need to periodically review the program and have an open mind to changes to achieve this 
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